Amartya Sen, jan 10 part 2
Jan. 10th, 2012 02:43 pm![[personal profile]](http://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
christabel372-73 - The basic general obligation here must be to consider seriously what one can reasonably do to help the realization of another person's freedom, taking note of its importance and influenceability, and of one's own circumstances and likely effectiveness.
373 - The necessity to ask that question (rather than to proceed on the possibly comforting assumption that we owe nothing to each other) can be the beginning of a more comprehensive line of ethical reasoning, and the territory of human rights belongs there.
Given any person's limited abilities and reach, and the priorities between different types of obligations as well as the demands of other . . . concerns one may reasonably havae, there is serious practical reasoning to be undertaken, in which one's various obligations (including imperfect obligations) must, directly or indirectly, figure.
The recognition of human rights is not an insistence that everone rises to help prevent and violation of any human right no matter where it occurs. It is, rather, an acknowledgment that if one is in a position to do something effective in preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have a good reason to do just that -- a reason that must be taken into acount in deciding what should be done.
There is a universal ethical demand here, but not one that automatically identifies contingency-free, ready-made actions.
375 - the presumed precision of legal rights is often contrasted with inescapable ambiguityes in the ethical claims of human rights.
376 - when the human right of a person not to be tortured is acknowledged, the importance of freedom from torture is reaffirmed and acclaimed for everyone
379 - economic and social rights -- welfare rights
384 - human rights advocates want the recognized human rights to be maximally realized.
385 - A claim that a certain freedom is important enough to be seen as a human right is also a claim that reasoned scrutiny would sustain that judgment.
386 - What sustainability of a judgement demands is a general apreciation of the reach of reasoning in favour of those rights, if and when others try to scrutinize the claims on an impartial basis.
387 - The fact that monitoring of violations of human rights and the proceduring of "naming and shaming" can be so effective (at least in putting the violators on the defensive) is some indication of the reach of public reasoning when information becomes available and ethical arguments are allowed rather than suppressed.
CHANCERY!
388-89 - what tends 'to inflame the minds' of suffering humanity cannot but be of immediate interest both to policy-making and to the diagnosis of injustice. A sense of injustice must be examined even if it turns out to be erroneously based, and it must, of course, be thoroughly pursued if it is well founded.
389 - Howeer, since injustices relate, often enough, to hardy social divisions, . . . it is often difficult to surmount those barriers to have an objective analysis of the contrast between what is happening and what could have happened -- a constrast that is central to the advancement of justice.
Outrage can be used to motivate, rather than to replace, reasoning.
390 - Resistance to injustice typically draws on both indignation and argumen.
393 - It is frequently asserted that justice should not only be done, but also be "seen to be done."
the administration of justice can, in general, be more effective if judges are seen to be doing a good job, rather than botching things up. If a judgment inspires confidence and general endorsement, then very likely it can be more easily implemented.
394 - If the importance of public reasoning has been one of the major concerns of this book, so has been the need to accept the plurality of reasons that may be sensibly accomodated in an exercise of evaluation. . . when they yield conflicting judgements, there is an important challenge in determining what credible conclusions can be derived, after considering all the arguments.
395 - non-commensurability - irreducible diversity between distinct objects of value.
nearly all appraisals undertaken as a part of normal living involve prioritization and weighting of distinct concerns, and that there is nothing particularly special in the recognition that evaluation has to grammple with competing priorities.
412 - Rawls's attempt at getting to a perfectly just society with a combination of ideal institutions and corresponding ideal behaviour. In a world where those extremely demanding behavioural assumptions do not hold, the institutional choices made will tend not to deliver the kind of society that would have strong claims to being seen as perfectly just.
a good deal of the theory presented here has been directly concerned with people's lives and capabilities, and the deprivation and suppression suffered.
414-15 - a number of different theories of justice share some common presumptions about what it is like to be a human being. We could have been creatures incapable of sympathy, unmoved by the pain and humiliation f others, uncaring of freedom, and -- no less significant -- unable to reason, argue, disagree and concur. The strong presence of these features in human lives does not tell us a great deal about what particular theory of justice should be chosen, but it does indicate that the general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, evven though we can go about that pursuit in different ways.
373 - The necessity to ask that question (rather than to proceed on the possibly comforting assumption that we owe nothing to each other) can be the beginning of a more comprehensive line of ethical reasoning, and the territory of human rights belongs there.
Given any person's limited abilities and reach, and the priorities between different types of obligations as well as the demands of other . . . concerns one may reasonably havae, there is serious practical reasoning to be undertaken, in which one's various obligations (including imperfect obligations) must, directly or indirectly, figure.
The recognition of human rights is not an insistence that everone rises to help prevent and violation of any human right no matter where it occurs. It is, rather, an acknowledgment that if one is in a position to do something effective in preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have a good reason to do just that -- a reason that must be taken into acount in deciding what should be done.
There is a universal ethical demand here, but not one that automatically identifies contingency-free, ready-made actions.
375 - the presumed precision of legal rights is often contrasted with inescapable ambiguityes in the ethical claims of human rights.
376 - when the human right of a person not to be tortured is acknowledged, the importance of freedom from torture is reaffirmed and acclaimed for everyone
379 - economic and social rights -- welfare rights
384 - human rights advocates want the recognized human rights to be maximally realized.
385 - A claim that a certain freedom is important enough to be seen as a human right is also a claim that reasoned scrutiny would sustain that judgment.
386 - What sustainability of a judgement demands is a general apreciation of the reach of reasoning in favour of those rights, if and when others try to scrutinize the claims on an impartial basis.
387 - The fact that monitoring of violations of human rights and the proceduring of "naming and shaming" can be so effective (at least in putting the violators on the defensive) is some indication of the reach of public reasoning when information becomes available and ethical arguments are allowed rather than suppressed.
CHANCERY!
388-89 - what tends 'to inflame the minds' of suffering humanity cannot but be of immediate interest both to policy-making and to the diagnosis of injustice. A sense of injustice must be examined even if it turns out to be erroneously based, and it must, of course, be thoroughly pursued if it is well founded.
389 - Howeer, since injustices relate, often enough, to hardy social divisions, . . . it is often difficult to surmount those barriers to have an objective analysis of the contrast between what is happening and what could have happened -- a constrast that is central to the advancement of justice.
Outrage can be used to motivate, rather than to replace, reasoning.
390 - Resistance to injustice typically draws on both indignation and argumen.
393 - It is frequently asserted that justice should not only be done, but also be "seen to be done."
the administration of justice can, in general, be more effective if judges are seen to be doing a good job, rather than botching things up. If a judgment inspires confidence and general endorsement, then very likely it can be more easily implemented.
394 - If the importance of public reasoning has been one of the major concerns of this book, so has been the need to accept the plurality of reasons that may be sensibly accomodated in an exercise of evaluation. . . when they yield conflicting judgements, there is an important challenge in determining what credible conclusions can be derived, after considering all the arguments.
395 - non-commensurability - irreducible diversity between distinct objects of value.
nearly all appraisals undertaken as a part of normal living involve prioritization and weighting of distinct concerns, and that there is nothing particularly special in the recognition that evaluation has to grammple with competing priorities.
412 - Rawls's attempt at getting to a perfectly just society with a combination of ideal institutions and corresponding ideal behaviour. In a world where those extremely demanding behavioural assumptions do not hold, the institutional choices made will tend not to deliver the kind of society that would have strong claims to being seen as perfectly just.
a good deal of the theory presented here has been directly concerned with people's lives and capabilities, and the deprivation and suppression suffered.
414-15 - a number of different theories of justice share some common presumptions about what it is like to be a human being. We could have been creatures incapable of sympathy, unmoved by the pain and humiliation f others, uncaring of freedom, and -- no less significant -- unable to reason, argue, disagree and concur. The strong presence of these features in human lives does not tell us a great deal about what particular theory of justice should be chosen, but it does indicate that the general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, evven though we can go about that pursuit in different ways.
